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INTRODUCTION
Final judicial decisions are infallible,1 and as such, they can neither
impose illegitimate harm nor confer unjust enrichment.2  But non-final
and interim decisions are fallible, and when such a decision is reversed
or set aside, the question is what harms inflicted and benefits gained as a
result of the reversed decision should be reassigned? By and large,
reversed judgments raise only a duty to restore direct benefits that one
received from his counterpart in compliance with the revoked decision-
money that has been paid thereunder or property that has been misallo-
cated due to the judgment.3 Litigating parties are not held responsible for
wrong judicial decisions and thus need not compensate their counterparts
for harms inflicted or disgorged profits generated by the reversed deci-
sion. However, this convention has at least one important exception:
remedies that are awarded, mainly in the form of compensation for
harms, in cases of wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions.
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1. As wryly and famously stated by Justice Jackson, "[w]e are not final because we are infalli-
ble, but we are infallible only because we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953).
2. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 72(1) (1937) ("A person who has con-
ferred a benefit upon another by complying with a judgment, or whose property has been taken
thereunder, is not entitled to restitution while the judgment remains valid and unreversed, merely
because it was improperly obtained, except in a proceeding in which the judgment is directly
attacked.").
3. See infra Part L.B.
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A preliminary injunction is a pre-trial order issued with an explicit
awareness of the possibility that it will be proved wrong.4 This aware-
ness is reflected not only in the courts' reluctance to issue such orders,
but also in the demand for the moving party to post a bond that would
cover the harms inflicted on any party who is found to have been wrong-
fully enjoined or restrained.5 Liability under such a bond can be imposed
whenever "it is ultimately found that the enjoined party had ... the right
to do the enjoined act."6  Yet the plaintiffs liability frequently covers
only a fraction of the actual costs and harms inflicted by the injunction.7
In addition, courts award restitution only of money paid or specific
property transferred in accordance with the preliminary injunction, but
courts reject most claims for restitution of benefits gained by the plaintiff
on the basis of the wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction.8 Are these
practices justified?
Consider, for example, the case of a preliminary injunction that
enjoined the defendant from producing and marketing a product based on
the plaintiffs claim that the defendant's activities violated the plaintiffs
patent. Once the court rejects the plaintiffs claims at the end of trial,
and decides that the defendant was entitled to produce and market the
product, should the defendant be fully compensated for harms inflicted
due to the wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction, including loss of
profits? Should the plaintiff be required to disgorge profits she gained
from the provisional injunction's adverse effect on competition in the
relevant market? What remedies, if any, should be available to third par-
ties who also suffered harm, such as the defendant's potential consumers
and suppliers? This Article aims to explore questions of this kind.
The issuance of a preliminary injunction temporarily assigns a legal
entitlement to the moving party, such as the power to stop the defendant
from acting in a certain way. It serves to prevent the irreparable social
harms that would have been inflicted had the court not issued the
preliminary injunction. 9 At the same time, because the provisional
injunction is issued without a full inquiry into the merits of the case,
4. See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman, Uncertainty and the Standard for Preliminary Relief 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 197, 199 (2003) (pointing out that at the preliminary injunction stage courts are typi-
cally uncertain about both the likely outcome on the merits and the harms each party faces).
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. Blumenthal v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 910 F.2d 1049, 1054 (2d Cir.
1990). See also infra Part I.A. The term "wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction" does not neces-
sarily imply that the court erred in issuing the provisional relief, given the available information at
the stage of the preliminary proceedings. It only indicates that ultimately, after considering the
plaintiffs claim on its merits, the court decided in favor of the defendant.
7. See infra Part I.A.
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See infra Part II.A.
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wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions may inflict irreparable social
harms. One making the decision whether to issue a preliminary injunc-
tion should therefore strive to minimize the irreparable harm arising from
an erroneous assignment of entitlements at the preliminary stage.
Consequently, the underlying aim of remedies for wrongfully-issued
preliminary injunctions is two-fold. First, from an ex-ante perspective,
the remedy should be designed to increase the likelihood that a
preliminary injunction is issued only when it is expected to induce less
irreparable social harms than those expected if it is not issued. Second,
from an ex-post perspective, the remedy should contribute to the minimi-
zation of irreparable social harms inflicted when a preliminary injunction
is issued.
This Article demonstrates that these considerations lead to two
central conclusions. First, it is desirable to award the remedy of restitu-
tion, which requires the moving party to disgorge all the benefits
obtained at the expense of the defendant as a result of the wrongfully-
issued preliminary injunction. Second, it may be unjustified to compel
the plaintiff to compensate the defendant for all harms inflicted by the
wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction.
From a broader perspective, the analysis enriches our understanding
of the variety of aims of restitutionary remedies. Traditionally, restitu-
tionary remedies are considered by the law and economics literature as a
vehicle for either internalizing positive externalities ° or deterring wrong-
ful behavior." The case of a wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction
demonstrates a third possible aim of disgorgement of profits-the
removal of improper motives to engage in an overall socially desirable
behavior. Applying for judicial relief in general, and for a preliminary
injunction in particular, are socially desirable activities. It may seem that
in order to encourage disputants to turn to the judicial system, the mov-
10. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans,
and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978) (explain-
ing the effect of restitutionary remedies on incentives to take part in rescue activity); Ariel Porat,
Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009) (arguing that the law should encourage the creation of positive benefits via
restitutionary remedies).
11. Jeff Berryman, The Case for Restitutionary Damages over Punitive Damages: Teaching
the Wrongdoer that Tort Does Not Pay, 73 CAN. BAR REV. 320 (1994); Daniel Friedmann, Restitu-
tion of Benefits Obtained through the Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 504, 551-56 (1980) (providing examples of cases in which "consideration of deter-
rence and punishment, coupled with the basic idea that man ought not to profit from his own wrong,
have led to the development of rules governing forfeiture of ill-gotten gains"); Ofer Grosskopf,
Protection of Competition Rules via the Law of Restitution, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1981, 2007-08 (2001)
(stating that restitution can advance the goal of effective deterrence against the breach of competition
rules better than damages).
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ing party should be given immunity from tortious liability. However,
such immunity might invite misuse. Plaintiffs may turn to the court, not
only when they believe in their cause, but also to extract undeserved
benefits.1 2 Establishing an expansive duty to disgorge profits derived
from unsuccessful litigation can mitigate the threat of frivolous suits
without jeopardizing the principle of free access to the courts. The case
of remedies for wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions thereby
demonstrates that restitution can serve as a middle ground between the
ideal, which drives us to confer rights and liberties, and reality, which
forces us to be mindful of their misuse.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the law of
remedies for wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions. Part L.A surveys
the doctrinal reasons for imposing on the moving party only partial
liability for the defendant's harms, while Part I.B presents the very
limited availability of the remedy of restitution for wrongfully-issued
preliminary injunctions under current law. Part II lays the theoretical
ground for the analysis. Part II.A discusses the underlying purpose
behind issuing a preliminary injunction: the minimization of the
irreparable loss of rights resulting from an erroneous assignment of
entitlements at the preliminary stage. Part II.B presents the standard for
issuing a preliminary injunction. Part II.C analyzes the possible paths by
which the remedy for wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions achieves
this aim. Part III deals with the ex-post perspective, and shows that the
remedy of restitution is better suited to achieve the aim of minimizing
irreparable social harms. Part IV inquires into the role remedies for
wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions play in shaping the parties'
incentives in deciding whether to apply for a preliminary injunction, and
shows the superiority of the restitutionary remedy in this respect.
I. THE LAW OF REMEDIES FOR WRONGFULLY-ISSUED
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
There are two possible types of remedies for wrongfully-issued
preliminary injunctions: compensating the enjoined party (usually the
defendant) for his losses, and recovering the gains accrued to the plain-
tiff.'3 This Part provides a brief overview of the current legal doctrines
and practices regarding these two remedies.
12. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 437 (1988); David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits are Brought for
Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 3 (1985).
13. The plaintiff may not always be the party requesting a preliminary injunction, but for sim-
plicity of exposition throughout this Article we refer to the party seeking a preliminary injunction as
the plaintiff.
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A. Compensation for Harms
According to Rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the applicant for a preliminary injunction is required to give a security (a
bond) "in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and
damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined
or restrained."' 14 On the basis of this provision, courts impose liability
upon the bond to compensate the defendant for his costs and damages
resulting from a wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction. Liability
upon the bond may be imposed whenever the preliminary injunction has
deprived the defendant of rights to which he was entitled.' 5 The defen-
dant need not prove that the issuance of the preliminary injunction was
an abuse of discretion at the time it was issued. 16 However, in practice,
the plaintiff often bears only part of the actual costs incurred and harms
suffered as a result of the issuance of a wrongfully-issued preliminary
injunction. Three doctrines induce this outcome.
The first is that the trial court has the power-and perhaps even the
duty-to consider the equities of the case before imposing liability upon
the bond and awarding damages by extracting from the bond that was
created prior to the proceedings. 17  This doctrine was set forth in the
Supreme Court's 1882 decision in Russell v. Farley,8 in which the Court
reasoned that since "no Act of Congress, or rule of this court" compelled
a court to require a bond before issuing a preliminary injunction, even in
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c). Most states replicate Rule 65(c) with some minor changes. DAN B.
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION 196 (2d abr. ed. 1993).
15. See, e.g., Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New Eng., Inc., 489 F.3d 13, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2007)
("An injunction can be 'wrongful' for Rule 65(c) purposes even when the initial issuance of the
injunction was proper .... [U]nder Rule 65(c), a party is wrongfully enjoined when it had a right all
along to do what it was enjoined from doing."); Slidell, Inc. v. Millennium Inorganic Chems., Inc.,
460 F.3d 1047, 1059 (8th Cir. 2006). See also DOBBS, supra note 14, at 202-03; Elizabeth Leight
Quick, Comment, The Triggering of Liability on Injunction Bonds, 52 N.C. L. REV. 1252, 1256
(1974); Note, Recovery for Wrongful Interlocutory Injunctions Under Rule 65(c), 99 HARV. L. REV.
828, 836-42 (1986) [hereinafter Recovery for Wrongful Interlocutory Injunctions].
16. Difficult questions, which we do not discuss here, arise when the plaintiff prevails on the
merits but only in part. For a discussion, see DOBBS, supra note 14, at 203: "The cases suggest a
wide range of possible solutions, but no real rationale."
17. See, e.g., Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 278 U.S. 228 (1929) (the trial court
may "refuse to allow recovery of any damages [on an injunction bond], even if the permanent
injunction should be denied"); Kansas ex rel. Stephan v. Adams, 705 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (10th Cir.
1983) ("[The] court is not bound to award damages on the bond without considering the equities of
the case .... [A] court, in considering the matter of damages, must exercise its equity power and
must effect justice between the parties, avoiding an inequitable result."); Monroe Div., Litton Bus.
Sys., Inc. v. De Bari, 562 F.2d 30, 33 (10th Cir. 1977) ("Equity comes into play in determining
whether there may be recovery and the amount thereof."); H & R Block, Inc. v. McCaslin, 541 F.2d
1098, 1099 (5th Cir. 1976) ("The awarding of damages pursuant to an injunction bond rests in the
sound discretion of the court's equity jurisdiction.").
18. Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433 (1882).
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 32:903
cases in which the court did require a bond, it has "the power to mitigate
the terms imposed [by the bond], or to relieve from them altogether." 19
Arguably, "[r]eliance on the Russell decision today is unwarranted
because its reasoning is explicitly based on the absence of a rule such as
Rule 65(c)." 20 Nevertheless, the prevailing view is that courts retain their
discretionary power to deny full, or even any, recovery on the bond.2'
A second reason for partial liability is the value of the bond. Not-
withstanding the language of Rule 65(c), the sum of the bond is often
lower than the costs incurred and damages suffered by parties who were
wrongfully restrained. The court sets the bond at an early stage of the
litigation when the defendant's possible costs and harms are often under-
22estimated. Moreover, courts frequently set the bond amount on the
basis of considerations such as the plaintiffs financial means23 or the
public interest in the suit, which are not related to the defendant's
expected costs and harms.2 4 Because the bond sets the upper limit for the
19.Id. at 441-42.
20. Recovery for Wrongful Interlocutory Injunctions, supra note 15, at 843.
21. See, e.g., Page Commc'ns Eng'rs, Inc. v. Froehlke, 475 F.2d 994, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Rule 65(c) "was not intended to negate the court's duty" to consider the equities of awarding dam-
ages on the bond, as it "gives the court discretion to fix bond in a nominal amount; clearly, the Rule
does not contemplate that a defendant who is wrongfully enjoined will always be made whole by
recovery of damages."); H & R Block, 541 F.2d at 1099. According to another view, followed by
other circuits, the court's discretion is much more limited. See Coyne-Delany Co. v. Capital Dev.
Bd. of Ill., 717 F.2d 385, 391 (7th Cir. 1983) ("The draftsmen [of Rule 65(c)] must have intended
that when such damages were incurred the plaintiff or his surety ... would normally be required to
pay the damages, at least up to the limit of the bond."). However, even the latter approach acknowl-
edges the trial court's discretion: "a prevailing defendant is entitled to damages on the injunction
bond unless there is a good reason for not requiring the plaintiff to pay in the particular case." Id.
For a review of the case law, see Recovery for Wrongful Interlocutory Injunctions, supra note 15, at
842-46, and DOBBS, supra note 14, at 200-O5.
22. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 14, at 205 ("Injunction bond cases raise many problems, not
the least of which is the fact that judges often underestimate the potential harm to a defendant.").
23. Erin Connors Morton, Security for Interlocutory Injunctions Under Rule 65(c): Exceptions
to the Rule Gone Awry, 46 HASTINGS L. J. 1863, 1892 (1995) ("The 'wide discretion' given [to the
trial courts in setting the appropriate bond amount] include reducing the bond amount to reflect the
likelihood of success on the merits of the injunction; setting a low amount when the plaintiff appears
financially responsible ... ; extending the indigency exception to middle-class parties suing their
insurers or former employers; or reading Congressional purpose to waive the bond into an expanding
number of federal statutes.").
24. See, e.g., Kansas ex rel. Stephan v. Adams, 705 F.2d 1267, 1270 (10th Cir. 1983); H & R
Block, 541 F.2d at 1099; Page Commc'ns, 475 F.2d at 997. For a review of the case law, see
DOBBS, supra note 14, at 200-05; Reina Calderon, Bond Requirements Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65(c): An Emerging Equitable Exemption for Public Interest Litigants, 13 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REv. 125 (1985); Morton, supra note 23, at 1885-91; and Recovery for Wrongful Interlocu-
tory Injunctions, supra note 15, at 842-46.
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25defendant's recovery, the plaintiff often bears only part of the
defendant's actual costs and harms2 6
Finally, the plaintiff does not bear the full cost of a wrongfully-
issued preliminary injunction because she is not liable for the
injunction's effects on third parties. The bond posted under Rule 65(c)
does not cover the injuries inflicted on those who were not formally
restrained but nevertheless suffered an injury, such as suppliers and con-
sumers who were harmed due to the preliminary injunction's adverse
effect on competition in the relevant market.27 Such third parties may
have a cause of action in restitution for actual payments they made to the
plaintiff,28 but they are not entitled to compensation for their own
damages.
The combined effect of these doctrines is that the plaintiff ends up
assuming only part of the social harm caused by the wrongfully-issued
preliminary injunction.29
B. Restitution of Benefits
In several decisions, the Supreme Court has recognized the right
to restitution of money paid in accordance with a judgment that was
subsequently reversed.3 ° Section 74 of the Restatement of Restitution
summarizes this line of cases by stating that "a person who has conferred
a benefit upon another in compliance with a judgment, or whose property
has been taken thereunder, is entitled to restitution if the judgment is
reversed or set aside." This rule applies to wrongfully-issued prelimi-
25. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757, 770 n.14 (1983) ("A party injured by the
issuance of an injunction later determined to be erroneous has no action for damages in the absence
of a bond."); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 925 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1991) (find-
ing liability is limited to the terms of the bond unless malicious prosecution or bad faith is proved).
See also DOBBS, supra note 14, at 197-99.
26. An example is the decision in Bragg v. Richardson, 54 F. Supp. 2d 635 (S.D. W. Va.
1999), in which the court granted a preliminary injunction and required the plaintiffs to post only a
"nominal" bond of $5,000, stating that "[a]ny other result would effectively deny Plaintiffs' right of
judicial review of the challenged policy .... Id. at 653. The court of appeals reversed the injunc-
tion, leaving the defendants with an uncompensated injury. Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d
275 (4th Cir. 2001).
27. See, e.g., A. J. Phipps, Non-party Compensation for Wrongful Interim Injunctions: Smith-
Kline Beecham Plc v. Apotex Europe Ltd., 26 Civ. JUST. Q. 10 (2007) (discussing this issue under
English law).
28. See infra Part I.B.
29. Dan B. Dobbs, Should Security be Required as a Pre-Condition to Provisional Injunctive
Relief?, 52 N.C.L. REV. 1091, 1122-25 (1974).
30. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. United States, 279 U.S. 781 (1929) (ordering
restitutions of all payments made by the appellants in favor of the appellees, pursuant to a judgment
subsequently reversed); Nw. Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U.S. 216 (1891). See also Rodger v. Comptoir
d'Escompte de Paris, (1871) L.R. 3 P.C. 465 (appeal taken from H.K.).
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nary injunctions as well, and the prevailing view is that such claims of
restitution are not capped by the amount of the bond.31
Under current law, however, the remedy of restitution for
wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions is very limited. Restitution is
available almost exclusively in cases in which a sum of money or a
specific property had been transferred from the defendant to the plaintiff
on the basis of the preliminary injunction; thus, only "restitution in kind"
or "money had and received" is available.32 Indeed, all thirty-two illus-
trations given by the Reporters of the Restatement of Restitution are
cases in which "money has been paid" or "property has been trans-
ferred., 33 This restriction is further emphasized in section 17 of the draft
of the Restatement of the Law (Third) on Restitution and Unjust Enrich-
ment, which explicitly limits restitutionary rights in the case of
"judgment subsequently reversed or avoided" to "transfer or taking of
property."
34
31. See, e.g., Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 249 U.S. 134, 145-46 (1919);
Nat'l Kidney Patients Ass'n v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1127, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Chestnut Hill Gulf,
Inc. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 616, 622 (D. Mass. 1992) ("When a party has received
money or property by virtue of an injunction subsequently reversed, he may be compelled to make
restitution even in the absence of an injunction bond."). See also DOBBS, supra note 14, at 199;
Dobbs, supra note 29, at 1136-37.
32. See, e.g., Tenth Ward Road Dist. No. II of Avoyelles Parish v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 12
F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1926) ("In this case the appellee received under the restraining order only a
delay in the collection of the tax, while the restraining order was in force. It is conceded that this is
not susceptible of restoration in kind. It is not in the power of the court to order appellee to turn the
clock back."). In Tenth Ward, the court found that "[t]here can be no restoration in the absence of a
receipt of the fruits of the decree, and the limitation upon the application of the principle is to cases
in which the party received under the decree what he is asked to restore to the adverse party, upon its
reversal." Id. See also Dobbs, supra note 29, at 1141-42 (arguing that the case law "may suggest
not only that restitution will be denied unless the plaintiffs gains are traceable to and identifiable
with the defendant's losses, but also that the gains must be directly traceable"); Eugene J. Metzger &
Michael E. Friedlander, The Preliminary Injunction: Injury Without Remedy?, 29 Bus. LAW. 913,
920 (1974) ("Notwithstanding the apparent ray of hope emanating from the Restatement and from
the theory of unjust enrichment, the practical result of the use of these theories has historically not
been too promising. Most courts have simply refused to grant relief ... ").
33. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 74 cmt. b (1937). An award of a restitutionary
remedy is demonstrated in the following cases. See, e.g., Nat ' Kidney Patients Ass'n, 958 F.2d at
1127 (allowing restitution from a health provider of Medicare payments made under a preliminary
injunction that was vacated); St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Consol. Fuel Co., 260 F. 638, 640
(8th Cir. 1919) (holding that when the defendant was ordered to supply coal to the plaintiff by a
preliminary injunction "[i]t would be a grave reproach to the administration of justice if, when a
court has wrongfully taken the property of one party and given it to another, it should be powerless
to make restitution. The law is otherwise."); Bedell Co. v. Harris, 240 N.Y.S. 550 (N.Y. App. Div.
1930) (ordering a preliminary injunction preventing the eviction of a tenant after the lease had
expired). Nonetheless, even in such cases, the courts have equitable discretion to deny restitution.
See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301 (1935).
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 17 (Discussion Draft
2000). The full text of section 17 is as follows: "A transfer or taking of property, in compliance with
or otherwise in consequence of a judgment that is subsequently reversed or avoided, gives the disad-
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Most preliminary injunctions do not order money to be paid
or property to be transferred, but rather freeze the status quo.
Consequently, the narrow reading of the right to restitution for wrong-
fully-issued preliminary injunctions makes this remedy unattainable in
most cases. 35 Moreover, even in the rare cases in which the court con-
cedes that the remedy should be more freely available, the restitutionary
claim is usually rejected on evidentiary grounds or on the basis of the
court's equitable discretion.36
A similar reluctance to use restitution as a remedy for wrongfully-
issued preliminary injunctions is evident in other common law countries.
In the recent case of SmithKline Beecham PLC v. Apotex Europe Ltd.,
the English Court of Appeal rejected such a claim, stating that "it seems
clear that both the United States and Australian courts have clearly
decided that there is no general principle of restitution available to a
party harmed by a 'wrong' court order., 37  In fact, to the best of our
knowledge, only one common law jurisdiction, Israel, allows an expan-
sive use of the restitutionary remedy in this context.38  The same
approach applies to claims of restitution by non-parties. L.J. Jacob,
referring to the U.S. law, observed the following in SmithKline:
[I]f a restitutionary claim lay for every non-party who loses money
or has to pay more as a result of a "wrongful" injunction, whether
interim or final, I would expect there to be masses of claims by way
vantaged party a claim in restitution to the extent necessary to avoid unjust enrichment." Id. The
comments and illustrations for this section deal with the transfer of money or property rights (illus-
tration 3 deals with the case of a wrong compulsory license). Id. There is no reference to the case of
preliminary injunctions, or to the case law that is henceforth mentioned. Id.
35. See, e.g., FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautic, 67 F.3d 931, 940 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Newman, J.,
concurring).
36. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 295 U.S. 301; Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Dep't of Consumer
Affairs, 60 F.3d 867 (1st Cir. 1995); Greenwood County v. Duke Power, 107 F. 2d 484 (4th Cir.
1939).
37. SmithKline Beecham PLC v. Apotex Europe Ltd., [2007] Ch. 71, 89. In this case the
English Court limited the restitutionary remedy to cases in which the wrong judgment allowed the
plaintiff to use the defendant's property. In Australia, the Supreme Court of Victoria imposed a
similar limitation. See Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd. v. Bond Brewing Holdings Ltd. (1991) 1 V.R. 386,
598 (Brooking, J.) ("[T]he principle of Rodger's Case allows no more than the passing back to that
party of what has been taken from him.").
38. The leading Israeli precedent on this matter is CA 280/73 Palimport Ltd. v. Ciba-Geigy
Ltd. [1975] lsrSC 29(1) 597, in which the Israeli Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff to sue for the
profits made by the defendant due to a wrong restraining order that the latter received against the
former in a previous litigation. For a discussion of this case, see Friedmann, supra note 11, at 537-
38. See also Daniel Friedmann, Valid, Voidable, Qualified, and Non-existing Obligations: An Alter-
native Perspective on the Law of Restitution, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 247, 265 (A.
Burrows ed., 1991) (describing the case as a "landmark decision"). This Israeli case was also
discussed at some length by L.J. Jacob in SmithKline, who summarized the discussion with the
following observation: "[I]s there a real prospect that the Israeli case would be followed here? ... I
have no doubt that it would not be so followed." SmithKline, [2007] Ch. at 96.
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of class action run on a contingency fee basis. But no one has
39pointed to any such case.
U.S. courts consider the possibility of awarding restitutionary
remedies for wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions in two main
types of cases. The first type involves benefits obtained by restraining
the defendant from competing with the plaintiff. It consists, for instance,
of cases in which a preliminary injunction was issued to protect a patent
that is eventually declared invalid, thus providing the plaintiff with an
unwarranted monopoly status during the litigation. Similarly, benefits
are sometimes derived from postponing the completion of a project
that would have adversely affected the plaintiffs interests. Courts have
systematically rejected attempts by defendants to obtain restitution of
such benefits. 40  They reason that a plaintiff who has benefitted from a
wrongfully-issued restraining order is not considered as acting "wrong-
fully," at least for the purpose of the law of unjust enrichment. 4' It is
often suggested that in such cases "[n]othing was taken from [the defen-
dant] by the injunction and given to the plaintiff,"'' and that the
defendant is not in position to establish his own loss of any of the profits
alleged to have been made by the moving party.4 3
The second category of cases involves benefits generated by enjoin-
44ing the use of the defendant's powers, such as tax collection, or
enforcement of price or wage control. In such cases, courts are much
more willing to employ restitutionary remedies in order to prevent unjust
enrichment. In the famous 1919 case of Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St.
Louis Southwestern Railway Co.,45 railroad companies obtained a pre-
liminary injunction to keep state commissioners from enforcing certain
railway freight rates. When the rate regulation was eventually upheld,
the Supreme Court affirmed that the railroad companies were liable to
refund those who purchased their services for the difference between the
39. SmithKline, [2007] Ch. at 90.
40. See, e.g., FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautic, 67 F.3d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1995); United Motors
Serv., Inc. v. Tropic-Aire, Inc., 57 F.2d 479, 483-84 (8th Cir. 1932); Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Leavitt,
481 F. Supp. 2d 434 (D. Md. 2007); SmithKline, [2007] Ch. 71. The only exceptions we are familiar
with are cases in which the preliminary injunction allowed the plaintiff to keep the defendant's prop-
erty or required the defendant to continue to provide a service for the plaintiff. See supra note 33.
41. See, e.g., Glaxo Group, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 437; Teel v. Hamilton-Wenham Reg'l Sch.
Dist., 433 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1982).
42. United Motors, 57 F.2d at 484. See also Greenwood County v. Duke Power, 107 F.2d 484,
487 (4th Cir. 1939) (holding that the wrongfully restrained party "has lost nothing which the [mov-
ing party] has received").
43. United Motors, 57 F.2d at 488.
44. See, e.g., Tenth Ward Road Dist. No. 11 of Avoyelles Parish v. Tex. & P. Ry. Co., 12 F.2d
245 (5th Cir. 1926).
45. 249 U.S. 134 (1919).
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rates prescribed by the commission and those charged by the railway
companies.46 The Supreme Court held that the railroad companies'
customers were entitled to restitution, even though they were not party to
the original proceedings.47 The Court noted that "during the time that
those decrees remained unreversed the railway companies obtained the
benefit of the injunction by exacting from [its customers] excess charges.
It is a typical case for the application of the principle of restitution.
'A8
Subsequent cases followed this ruling.49 This outcome is consistent with
the doctrine described above of awarding restitution to those who
directly transferred sums of money to the plaintiff as a result of the
preliminary injunction.
The Arkadelphia decision may suggest that the regulator represents
the customers not only in defending the rate schedules, but also in
collecting the plaintiffs unjust enrichment. The Court pointed out that
"[t]he railroad commission, in defending the rate schedules against the
attack of the railway companies, represented all shippers., 50  However,
courts mostly reject claims for restitution by regulators on the basis of
the equitable nature of this remedy. 5' Among the few exceptions to this
rule is the 1958 D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Mitchell v.
Riegel Textile,52 where the court allowed the Secretary of Labor to
collect the profits made by employers from the delay in enforcing a
minimum wage order. The court of appeals noted that the difference
between the wages paid while the injunction was in effect and the mini-
mum wage that the Secretary had fixed was "the amount by which the
plaintiffs were unjustly enriched at the employees' expense. Since sepa-
rate suits by each employee would be unreasonably burdensome to the
parties and the courts, the Secretary may recover as the representative of
46. Id. at 145 ("A party against whom an erroneous judgment or decree has been carried into
effect is entitled, in the event of a reversal, to be restored by his adversary to that which he has lost
thereby. ... [This] course of action . . . is one of the equitable powers, inherent in every court of
justice ....").
47. Id. at 146.
48. Id. It should be further noted that in this case the preliminary injunction was issued under
the explicit condition that the companies would refund their customers if the complaint was
discharged. Id. at 138.
49. Exparte Lincoln Gas & Elec. Light Co., 256 U.S. 512, 517-19 (1921); Middlewest Motor
Freight Bureau v. United States, 433 F.2d 212, 224-40 (8th Cir. 1970); Williams v. Wash. Metro.
Area Transit Comm'n, 415 F.2d 922, 941-47 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
50. Arkadelphia Milling Co., 249 U.S. at 146.
51. See, e.g., Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867 (1st Cir. 1995)
(affirming the denial of a restitutionary claim that was brought by the Puerto Rico Department of
Consumer Affairs against petroleum wholesalers who were shielded against its imposed price
controls for several years by injunctions).
52. 259 F.2d 954 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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all employees. 53 Afterwards, the Secretary moved the district court for
an order requiring the plaintiffs to make good on their underpayments of
wages, with interest.
5 4
To sum up, while courts readily require the moving party to assume
(often partial) liability for the harms inflicted by a wrongfully-issued
preliminary injunction, they are much more reluctant to award a restitu-
tionary remedy of disgorgement of profits.
II. PURPOSES OF REMEDIES FOR WRONGFULLY-ISSUED
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
Remedies for wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions should be
designed to enhance the underlying aim of preliminary injunctions-
minimizing social harm. We start with a brief survey of this purpose
(Part II.A) and a description of the standard used for issuing a prelimi-
nary injunction (Part II.B), before moving on to present the possible
paths through which remedies for wrongfully-issued preliminary
injunctions can contribute to achieving this aim (Part II.C).
A. Aim of Issuing Preliminary Injunctions
It takes time, often months and even years, to decide a case and to
provide an effective remedy for the protection of rights. 55 During this
period, irreversible events may make the legal remedy ineffective.
Preliminary pre-trial remedies are designed to ease this problem by
mitigating the risk of the occurrence of such irreversible events. 56 John
Leubsdorf even argued that a plaintiff may have a constitutional right to
preliminary relief since "a state which arbitrarily denies a plaintiff a
remedy deprives him of his property right in his cause of action without
due process of law. 5 7 To achieve its goal, the preliminary remedy must
53. Id. at 955. The Court added that "[ilt is immaterial that the traditional word 'restitution' is
not clearly applicable to these case [sic] in which unjust enrichment has resulted from paying too
little and not from collecting too much. Equitable principles are not confined by rigid formulas. As
soon as the underpayments were made, unjust enrichment was complete." Id. at 955-56.
54. Id. at 955.
55. For instance, the median time intervals from filing to disposition of civil cases in which
trial was completed by U.S. district courts during the twelve-month period ending September 30,
2008, was thirty-two months. JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS:
2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 174 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus
2008/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf.
56. The preliminary relief may also prevent the defendant from inflicting reparable harms
during the trial, and may thus save the plaintiff the litigation costs of suing for compensation for
these harms and protect the plaintiff from the risk of judicial error of awarding insufficient
compensation. See infra note 67.
57. John Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEx. L. REV. 579, 621 (1984).
Leubsdorf argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 407 U.S. 67
(1972), implies that the state's denial of a remedy is a "state action," bringing the due process clause
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be issued quickly and early in the course of litigation, before all the evi-
dence can be studied or even made available. Accordingly, a temporary
restraining order may sometimes be issued ex parte.58 Preliminary in-
junctions are issued on the basis of a hearing; however, the hearing "is
usually attenuated and much less than due process would require for a
full trial."59  It is widely recognized that to meet the due process
requirements it is sufficient to offer the defendant a speedy, even if only
rudimentary, hearing after the issuance of a restricting order, with the
right to damages for wrongful injunctions.60
The decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction-including
temporary restraining orders-raises an inherent difficulty. On the one
hand, this relief is often an essential tool for protecting the plaintiff's
interests, given the legal system's deficiencies in providing final reme-
dies in due course and the prospect of irreparable harms. On the other
hand, the fact that the relief is issued without a full inquiry into the
merits of the case entails a substantial risk that the issuance of the
preliminary injunction will unjustifiably harm the defendant, as well as
third parties and the public interest.61  The required inquiry, then, is
which preliminary decision will "minimize the probable irreparable loss
of rights" 62 from an erroneous (preliminary) assignment of entitlements.
B. Standard of Issuing Preliminary Injunctions
Preliminary relief should be issued only if (1) the injunction is
required to prevent an irreparable harm, and (2) this expected harm
outweighs the expected irreparable harm imposed as a result of the pre-
into play. See also David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace
Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627, 629 (1988) ("By denying
protection to a plaintiff who has successfully proven that only an injunction will prevent illegal and
irreparable harm, the judge leaves the plaintiff short of the rightful position.").
58. A temporary restraining order may not exceed 10 days, unless the court finds good cause or
the restrained party consents to such an extension. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
59. DOBBS, supra note 14, at 184.
60. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (upholding procedures that offer the
defendant a speedy hearing after the state acts, with damages for any improper action); Friends For
All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (same). See also
Leubsdorf, supra note 57, at 620-24. In contrast, it is probably unconstitutional to issue a temporary
restraining order without any notice to the restrained defendant, when the order inflicts serious injury
and the defendant could be given a chance to argue against it without any harm to the plaintiff. Id. at
621. For instance, the Supreme Court has limited the power of states to freeze bank accounts
without adequate procedural safeguards against abuse. See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
61. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 14, at 187 ("The potential for abuse and error in injunctive
orders is usually very large.").
62. John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 525
(1978).
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liminary injunction.63 This general standard, known as the "Leubsdorf-
Posner" error-minimizing formulation,64  is often (at least implicitly)
applied by courts,65 along with the more traditional, four-factor "balance
of the hardships" test.6 6 Some aspects of the "expected irreparable harm"
concept have been analyzed extensively in literature. Among these are
the debate about risk aversion as a possible reason for the inherent inade-
quacy of a pecuniary remedy to compensate for harms 67 and the concern
that a delay in providing relief would result in a party's insolvency.68 In
63. Thus, it is immaterial whether the moving party seeks to preserve the status quo or to devi-
ate from it. See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 109, 157-66 (2001) (arguing that the heightened standard in cases of preliminary
injunction that upset the status quo is historically and theoretically unsound, and supporting a
uniform standard).
64. This formulation was first suggested by Professor John Leubsdorf. See Leubsdorf, supra
note 62. It was later developed by Judge Richard Posner in his opinion in American Hospital Supply
Corp. v. Hospital Products, Ltd., 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that a preliminary injunction
should be issued "only if the harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is denied, multiplied by the prob-
ability that the denial would be an error (that the plaintiff, in other words, will win at trial), exceeds
the harm to the defendant if the injunction is granted, multiplied by the probability that granting the
injunction would be an error"). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
595-96 (7th ed. 2007).
65. See, e.g., Micro Signal Research, Inc. v. Otus, 417 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 2005); Roland
Machinery Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984); Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix
Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984) (The goal of the preliminary injunction doctrine
is "to minimize the risk that a litigant will suffer an irreparable loss of legal rights in the period
before final resolution of the dispute."); Constructors Ass'n of W. Pa. v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811, 815,
815 n.8 (3d Cir. 1978). For a review of the application of this formulation, see DOBBS, supra note
14, at 191-92 ("A number of cases now adopt the Leubsdorf formula, or one that seems practically
indistinguishable."); Joshua P. Davis, Taking Uncertainty Seriously: Revising Injunction Doctrine,
34 RUTGERS L.J. 363, 367 (2003) ("Reliance on an analysis fundamentally akin to Leubsdorf's
framework is now common in federal courts."); Ann E. Heiny, Formulating a Theory for Prelimi-
nary Injunctions: American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products Ltd., 72 IOWA L. REV. 1157
(1987); Lee, supra note 63, at 154 ("The economic model proposed by Leubsdorf and refined by
Posner has since emerged as the triumphant, dominant theory of preliminary injunctions.").
66. According to this test, the relevant requirements are: (1) a reasonable likelihood of success
on the merits, (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted, (3) an evaluation of the balance of
hardships, and (4) an assessment of the impact of the injunction on the public interest. See, e.g.,
Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1997). For a discussion of the dif-
ferent standards, see Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform
Federal Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495 (2003), pointing at substantial inconsistencies in the standard
applied by the federal courts; and Arthur D. Wolf, Preliminary Injunctions: The Varying Standards,
7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 173 (1984), discussing the same.
67. See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods., Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 597 (7th Cir. 1986)
("When a court speaks of damages as being 'irreparable' because they are difficult to measure it can
mean only that confining the injured party to a remedy of damages creates a risk he may not like
(because he is risk adverse ... ), even though the upside risk is as large as the downside risk."); cf
Douglas Lichtman, Irreparable Benefits, 116 YALE L.J. 1284, 1292 (2007) ("Most irreparable harms
... are irreparable only in the sense that the harm at issue is difficult for a court to value."). -
68. See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 329-
33 (1999) (the risk that the defendant will become insolvent does not establish the plaintiff's right to
a preliminary injunction). Cf Am. Hosp., 780 F.2d at 597 ("A preliminary injunction that will or
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what follows, we briefly comment on two other aspects of this
formulation.
First, the issuance of a preliminary injunction inflicts relevant harm
only if it turns out that the relief wrongly enjoined a party; respectively,
the issuance of a preliminary injunction prevents relevant harm only if it
turns out that it rightly enjoined a party. Therefore, the scope of the
irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued should be discounted by
the likelihood that the plaintiff will win the case as evaluated at the pre-
trial stage; the amount of irreparable harm if the injunction is issued
should be similarly discounted according to the defendant's likelihood of
success.69 Hence, the relevant comparison is between the expected value
of the irreparable harm each of the possible decisions would cause.
0
This approach is based on the notion that an "efficient" preliminary
injunction is one that minimizes costs given a certain set of legal rights,
i.e., given a certain distribution of entitlements.7 ' The underlying
assumption is that legal rights have their merit. Disrupting the allocation
may precipitate a firm into bankruptcy is ...a source of costs which ought to be considered in
deciding whether to grant such an injunction."); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edwards Pharmacal
Corp., 443 F.2d 867, 886 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J.); Lars E. Johansson, The Mareva Injunction: A
Remedy in the Pursuit of the Errant Defendant, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1998); Rhonda
Wasserman, Equity Renewed: Preliminary Injunctions to Secure Potential Money Judgments, 67
WASH. L. REV. 257, 263 (1992); Note, Leading Cases: I. Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure: B.
Equity Jurisdiction: Preliminary Injunctions on Debtors' Assets, 113 HARV. L. REV. 316, 324-26
(1999) (stating that injunctive relief is appropriate if an investor does not have adequate legal rem-
edy in the case of the debtor's insolvency).
69. For a suggestion to refine this standard, see Davis, supra note 65, stating that each party's
irreparable harm should be discounted according to the likelihood that the party is right, rather than
the likelihood that the actual result of the trial will be in its favor, thus accounting for the court's
degree of confidence about the merits of a case; and Lichtman, supra note 4, suggesting to take into
account the court's level of uncertainty about its estimates of the harms.
70. This formulation thus represents a "sliding scale" approach, which allows a party with less
than a 50% chance of winning on the merits to succeed on the motion. DOBBS, supra note 14, at
193-96 ("The plaintiff with less than a 50% chance of success could still justly receive ... pretrial
assistance if it will prevent an enormous irreparable loss compared to a minimal loss for the defen-
dant."). For a critique, see Linda J. Silberman, Injunctions by the Numbers: Less than the Sum of Its
Parts, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 279, 304-07 (1987), finding that the formula deviates from "the tradi-
tional standard for issuance of preliminary injunctions" since it "does not suggest that any threshold
amount of harm or probability of success is necessary"; and Denlow, supra note 66, at 538. See also
Centurion Reinsurance Co. v. Singer, 810 F.2d 140, 145 (7th Cir. 1987) ("No matter how strongly
the balance of irreparable harms may incline in favor of the party asking for a preliminary injunc-
tion, it is error to grant the injunction if the party has ... only a very slight chance of prevailing on
the merits."); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) ("The traditional standard for
granting a preliminary injunction requires the plaintiff to show that in the absence of its issuance he
will suffer irreparable injury and also that he is likely to prevail on the merits.").
71. For a similar approach, see John Leubsdorf, Preliminary Injunctions: In Defense of the
Merits, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 44 (2007), stating that "[i]t would be better for courts to retain the
law as their initial guide to deciding what conduct is socially undesirable, even at the interlocutory
stage, rather than trying to evaluate efficiency on a case-by-case basis."
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structure they create is thus costly. It may, for example, hinder incen-
tives to invest. This "entitlement-sensitive" formulation is distinguished
from an "entitlement-blind" approach, which is based solely on an
evaluation of the aggregated effects of the preliminary injunction on
social welfare.72 To illustrate, assume that the irreparable harm if the
injunction is not issued is $100, and that the irreparable harm if it is
issued is $80. The entitlement-blind approach calls for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction regardless of the likelihood of the possible out-
comes of the trial, as the assignment of the entitlement to the plaintiff in
this case yields a higher value (a savings of $100) than its alternative
($80). However, under the entitlement-sensitive formulation, it is ineffi-
cient to issue the preliminary injunction if the likelihood that the
entitlement assigned to the defendant is high enough (in this example, if
this likelihood exceeds 56%). 73 Examining the justifications for adopting
an "entitlement-sensitive" approach is beyond the scope of our inquiry.
It suffices to say that various reasons can justify requiring the court to be
entitlement-sensitive in the present scenario, including the public interest
in confining public authorities to lawful actions, and evidentiary difficul-
ties, such as the complexity of assessing and providing full
compensation. Accordingly, in the discussion that follows, the term
"efficient preliminary injunction" is used to denote an application of the
entitlement-sensitive approach.
The second comment refers to the definition of the relevant harms
in the error-minimizing formulation. As indicated above, according to
this formulation, preliminary relief should be issued only if (1) the
injunction is required to prevent an irreparable harm, and (2) this
expected harm outweighs the expected irreparable harm imposed as a
result of the preliminary injunction. As indicated, the standard for
issuing preliminary injunctions should aim at minimizing judicial
errors.74 Under an efficiency-based approach, the "costs" of errors aremeasured from a social, ex-ante perspective. Therefore, the relevant
72. An "entitlement-blind" approach is implicitly applied by Richard R.W. Brooks & Warren
F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58
STAN. L. REV. 381, 403-04 (2005).
73. According to the error-minimizing formulation, a preliminary injunction should be issued
in this case only if: SlOOp > $80(1 -p), where p is the likelihood that the entitlement is assigned to
the plaintiff. This inequality yields that a preliminary injunction should be issued only ifp > 4/9,
i.e., if(1 -p) < 5/9 _ 56%.
74. Lichtman, supra note 67, at 1287 n.3 ("The goal according to virtually every scholarly and
judicial account [is to minimize deviations from what will be the ultimate ruling on the merits].").
See also ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 131 (2003)
(defining "expected error cost"); POSNER, supra note 64, at 594-95 (discussing costs of error in civil
cases); Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J.
1643, 1647-49 (1985) (noting effort to minimize risk of error as central to fairness in litigation).
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harm of a decision not to issue a preliminary injunction is measured not
only according to the plaintiffs harm, but also according to the cost of
the expected effect on future behavior of those in the plaintiffs position.
For instance, the social cost of denying a preliminary injunction to a
patent holder includes the adverse effects of such a decision on incen-
tives to invest in research.75  In terms of the formal doctrine, this aspect
is taken into account under the "public interest" factor.76
It is important to distinguish in this respect between two types of
possible harms of a decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction: a
direct net loss of social welfare ("deadweight-loss"), and an errant trans-
fer of wealth from a party who is legally entitled to it to a party who is
not entitled to it ("undeserved-wealth-transfer"). Consider a preliminary
injunction that restricts the defendant from producing a drug due to its
alleged violation of the plaintiffs patent, thus eliminating competition
with the plaintiff. If proved wrong, the preliminary injunction may
generate deadweight-loss, such as a loss of production and consumption
of the drug.7 7 A wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction may also cre-
ate undeserved-wealth-transfer by enabling the plaintiff to extract profits
that would otherwise be obtained by the defendant. Deadweight-loss is
clearly a relevant social cost for determining whether to issue a prelimi-
nary injunction. Undeserved-wealth-transfer is relevant too, as far as it
75. Lichtman, supra note 67, at 1289 ("[An errant denial of a patent holder request for prelimi-
nary injunction inflicts] a social cost because mistakes like this will over the long run dampen the ex
ante incentive to pursue patent-eligible research, discourage patent holders from litigating even valid
claims, and likely drive inventors to invest more heavily in costly self-help protections.").
76. See, e.g., Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 387 (7th Cir. 1984)
(Posner J.) (finding that in cases in which "granting or denying a preliminary injunction will have
consequences beyond the immediate parties ... those interests-the 'public interest' if you will-
must be reckoned into the weighing process."). Some scholars argue that harms to "non-parties"
should not be considered in the decision whether to issue the preliminary injunction. See, e.g.,
Denlow, supra note 66, at 539; Leubsdorf, supra note 62, at 549 ("[T]o consider interests irrelevant
to the final decision at the preliminary stage will only increase the cost of the litigation and under-
mine the substantive law."); Lea B. Vaughn, A Need for Clarity: Toward a New Standard for Pre-
liminary Injunctions, 68 OR. L. REV. 839, 848 (1989) ("In the midst of existing fact uncertainty, an
unbounded consideration of public interest threatens to overwhelm the process"); Wolf, supra note
66, at 234-35. However, the prevailing view is that third-parties' interests are relevant. See Am.
Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods., Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1986); DOUGLAs LAYCOCK,
THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 273 (1991) (arguing that the court should consider
"the severity and the likelihood of such harm to each litigant and to the public if the requested relief
is granted and if it is denied"); Leubsdorf, supra note 71, at 41-43; Orin H. Lewis, "The Wild Card
That Is the Public Interest": Putting a New Face on the Fourth Preliminary Injunction Factor, 72
TEX. L. REV. 849, 854, 874-82 (1994); Laura W. Stein, The Court and the Community: Why Non-
Party Interests Should Count in Preliminary Injunction Actions, 16 REV. LITIG. 27 (1997).
77. Conferring a monopoly status will enable the plaintiff to raise the price above the competi-
tive market price until the additional revenue will be equal to the marginal cost of production. In
efficiency terms, that means that the plaintiff is under-producing because some costumers, who are
willing to pay more than the cost of production, are not being served.
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adversely affects the underlying purpose of assigning the
relevant legal entitlement, such as providing optimal incentives to invest
in research and development.78
The distinction between these two types of social costs is essential
for the discussion that follows because they differ in terms of their
reparability by an ex-post remedy. The remedy can eliminate unde-
served-wealth-transfers. In contrast, compensation for deadweight-loss
merely reallocates the burden from one party to another without
eliminating the social cost. In this respect, the traditional definition of
irreparable harm as a "harm that cannot be cured by a remedy after
trial" 79 should be qualified. A deadweight-loss suffered by one party is
socially irreparable even if this party's private loss can be cured by a
remedy after trial. The available remedies-both when the plaintiff
prevails and a preliminary injunction was not issued, and when a wrong-
fully-issued preliminary injunction was issued but the defendant
prevails--determine only what undeserved-wealth-transfers should be
regarded as relevant irreparable social costs.
80
In sum, the decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction
should aim at minimizing the expected irreparable social costs that result
from the delay in deciding the case on the merits. The decision requires
an evaluation of the probability of the alternative possible outcomes of
the case. Deadweight-loss should always be considered an irreparable
social cost given that compensation for it merely reallocates the damage
but does not eliminate it. In contrast, undeserved-wealth-transfers should
be so considered only if an ex-post restitutionary remedy is unavailable,
either legally or practically (due to judgment proof problems).
C. Aims of Remedies for Wrongfully-Issued Preliminary Injunctions
As indicated above, even a careful application of the standard of
issuing a preliminary injunction cannot exclude the possibility that the
injunction will be proved wrong, given that it is issued before the court
decides the case on its merits. In general, litigating parties are not held
78. Thus, the relevant social cost in this case should be calculated based on the expected effect
of such transfer of wealth on relevant incentives. As recently pointed out by Douglas Lichtman, a
decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction that confers "errant irreparable benefits" on one
party may inflict social harm even if the other litigating party does not suffer any loss. Lichtman,
supra note 67, at 1289-90 ("Undeserved irreversible gains skew the defendant's incentives with
respect to the question of whether to litigate or settle. They also encourage the defendant to invest
further in research ....").
79. LAYCOCK, supra note 76, at 113.
80. For further elaboration of this point, see Ofer Grosskopf & Barak Medina, Repairing (the
Doctrine o) Irreparable Harm 1 (2008) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=-
1091730.
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responsible for wrong judicial decisions; thus, litigating parties need not
compensate their adversaries for harms inflicted or disgorge profits
generated by a reversed decision.8 1 Given this general rule, it is puzzling
why an award to remedy a wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction
would be justified.
It should be noted that this puzzle is distinct from the inquiry into
the rationale of the bond requirement. The primary function of the bond
is to serve as a fund to ensure compensation to a wrongfully-enjoined
defendant and to facilitate the collection of the damages awarded.82  In
addition, because the bond sets an upper limit as to the plaintiffs liabil-
ity, it provides the plaintiff with information regarding the scope of his
potential liability for wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions.8 3 These
aims are based on the assumption that liability is imposed; they do not
justify the liability. Similarly, the argument that the plaintiffs fulfill-
ment of the bond provision should be viewed as consenting to liability up
to the amount of the bond, i.e., as the "price for the injunction, ' 8 does
not explain why such liability is imposed in the first place. It is our aim
to offer such explanations.
We suggest that the remedy for wrongfully-issued preliminary
injunctions can serve the aim of minimizing irreparable harms in three
ways. First, from an ex-post perspective, the remedy can serve to rectify
the consequences of a wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction and,
therefore, to minimize irreparable social harms. Second, the remedy
affects the amount of information that the court should consider before
issuing a preliminary injunction. It can thus increase the likelihood that
the decision, made at the preliminary stage, will be the correct one.
Third, from an ex-ante perspective, the remedy shapes the plaintiffs
incentives to apply for preliminary relief and the defendant's motivation
to object to it. We discuss the first two ways in Part III, and the third in
Part IV.
81. Reversed judgments raise only a duty to restore direct benefits that one received from his
counterpart in compliance with the revoked decision-money that has been paid thereunder or
property that has been misallocated due to the judgment. See supra Part l.B.
82. See, e.g., Erin Connors Morton, Security for Interlocutory Injunctions Under Rule 65(c):
Exceptions to the Rule Gone Awry, 46 HASTiNGS L. J. 1863, 1866-67 (1995).
83. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 14, at 197 ("The bond serves to warn plaintiffs the price they
may be compelled to pay if the injunction is wrongfully issued."); Morton, supra note 82, at 1870.
84. See, e.g., Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 805 (3d Cir. 1989);
Morton, supra note 82, at 1870-71; Recovery for Wrongful Interlocutory Injunctions, supra note 15,
at 842-46 (stating that the bond requirement and the remedy that is based on it can be seen as "a
contract in which the court and plaintiff 'agree' to the bond amount as the 'price' of a wrongful
injunction").
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III. MINIMIZING IRREPARABLE HARMS
A. General
Remedies for wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions serve to
mitigate the consequences of the wrongful restriction on the defendant.
As suggested by Dan Dobbs, "[t]he main purpose of the bond require-
ment is to protect the defendant from irreparable loss of rights due to a
decision made before trial., 85  However, since a deadweight-loss is
socially irreparable, this rationale justifies only remedies that correct
undeserved-wealth-transfers.
86
The remedy also affects the likelihood that the case will be decided
on its merits. Social harms inflicted by a preliminary injunction can be
reduced only if the proceedings continue until the dispute is resolved in a
final judgment. However, if the defendant cannot expect to receive a
remedy for a wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction, even if he even-
tually wins the case, he may not have sufficient incentives to litigate the
case after losing in the preliminary stage. Consider, for example, the
case of a competitor who challenges the validity of a patent. If the
patentee obtains a preliminary injunction and the case is expected to be
litigated for most of the period in which the patent is economically
valuable, the challenger has no reason to continue litigating the issue any
further unless a remedy for wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions is
available. Therefore, an insufficient remedy discourages the defendant
from litigating the case and may prevent the mitigation of social harms
resulting from wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions.
85. DOBBS, supra note 14, at 197. See also Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d
186, 210 (3d Cir. 1990) (protecting the defendant "is important in the preliminary injunction context,
for 'because of attenuated procedure, an interlocutory order has a higher than usual chance of being
wrong'); Dobbs, supra note 29, at 1094 (arguing that the purpose of the remedy for a wrongfully-
issued preliminary injunction is to compensate the defendant "who has been subjected to a process
of law that does not meet the kind of standards ordinarily adopted"); Quick, supra note 15, at 1256
("In order to protect the defendant from harm caused by the recognized need for a speedy determina-
tion of interlocutory injunctive relief, the properly fixed bond serves to minimize the drastic effect of
this anticipatory relief on the enjoined party.").
86. A corrective justice perspective may yield a different result. However, it requires a more
detailed analysis than we can provide here. It is easy to justify the assignment of responsibility to
the plaintiff for the consequences of a wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction when his behavior is
blameworthy. But this is not the case with respect to an innocent, blameless plaintiff. The costs of
issuing a pre-trial injunction-the harms inflicted by a wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction-
are the result of the inability of the legal system to quickly decide the case and provide an effective
remedy for the protection of rights. Thus, when there is a bona fide controversy about the parties'
rights, and irreparable harms might be inflicted due to the delay in resolving the case, it is far from
self-evident that it is the plaintiff who should be liable for the harms inflicted by a wrongfully-issued
preliminary injunction.
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In addition, because the remedy determines what part of the harm is
socially reparable, it defines what parts of the preliminary injunction's
expected social harms can be ignored in deciding whether to issue the
preliminary injunction. Given the difficulties in accurately evaluating
these harms, a remedy that enables the court to disregard certain types of
harms may increase the likelihood of a correct decision. Again, because
harm of the sort of undeserved-wealth-transfer is potentially reparable, it
is justified to provide remedies that correct this type of harm, to make it
irrelevant in deciding whether to issue the preliminary injunction. In
contrast, the aim of improving the court's decision-making process
cannot justify the provision of remedies that compensate the defendant
for harms which represent deadweight-loss.
Finally, the remedy also affects the threshold level of the
probability that the plaintiff will win the case on its merits. To obtain a
preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is required to show that the probabil-
ity that she will win the case on its merits exceeds some threshold that is
set by the legal doctrine." An efficiency-based approach requires that
this threshold be set according to the parties' likely irreparable harms.88
According to the Leubsdorf-Posner error-minimizing formulation, the
preliminary injunction should be issued only if Ap > S(1 -p), where A is
the irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is not issued, S is the
irreparable harm resulting from a wrongfully-issued preliminary
injunction, and p is the probability that the plaintiff will win the case
on its merits.89  This formulation yields that the threshold level of p
is determined by p > S/(A+S). Thus, the greater the irreparable harm
resulting from a wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction (S), the higher
the threshold. A remedy that reduces the defendant's irreparable harm
(by eliminating undeserved-wealth-transfers) increases the number of
cases in which the plaintiff is protected from irreparable harms. 90
Thus, improving the court's decision-making process at the stage of
granting the preliminary injunction requires that the court be able to
87. See supra note 70.
88. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 64, at 595-96.
89. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
90. For instance, assume that the socially irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is not
issued is $80 and the harm from a wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction is $120, out of which
$50 reflects a deadweight-loss and $70 represents undeserved-wealth-transfer. Absent a remedy for
wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions, a preliminary injunction would be issued only if the
plaintiff's likelihood of winning the case exceeds 60% (because according to the error-minimizing
formulation, the preliminary injunction should be issued only if S80p > ($70+$50)(1 - p), which
yields that p>6 0%). In contrast, if the plaintiff must compensate the defendant for an undeserved-
wealth-transfer, a preliminary injunction should be issued whenever the plaintiff's likelihood
of success exceeds 38.5% (because the preliminary injunction should be issued only if $S80p >
$50(1-p), which yields that p>
3 8 .5%).
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disregard as much undeserved-wealth-transfers as possible. To achieve
this goal, the remedy should be tailored to eliminate all of the reparable
wealth transfers. From this perspective, there is no point in remedying
deadweight-loss, given that transferring deadweight-loss from the
defendant to the plaintiff does not eliminate the court's duty to take this
element into account, as part of the social cost of granting the prelimi-
nary injunction. In the next Part, we evaluate the two types of remedies
for wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions in light of these
considerations.
B. An Evaluation of the Possible Remedies
1. Compensation for Harms
Achieving the purpose of minimizing irreparable social costs
requires that the defendant be fully compensated for harms in the form of
undeserved-wealth-transfer. The current practice of partial liability cre-
ates severe informational problems. It requires the courts to base the de-
cision not only on the relevant deadweight-loss of each of the alternative
decisions, but also on undeserved-wealth-transfers that are left
uncompensated. Given that the court often does not have access to this
data, the need to base the decision whether to issue the preliminary
injunction on such additional information increases the likelihood of
error. This problem is of special importance due to the rule that, while
the bond sets the upper limit of the plaintiffs liability, the decision
whether to issue the preliminary injunction is made before the court
determines the amount of the bond. Since the bond is often set based on
factors that are unrelated to the defendant's expected harm, 9l the court
cannot accurately assess, at the stage of deciding whether to issue the
relief, what part of the wealth transfer from a wrongfully-issued prelimi-
nary injunction should be considered as an irreparable social cost.
Consequently, even if one does not accept our argument in full, it is
essential to decide whether to issue the preliminary injunction in light of
a given size of the bond, and not the other way around.
Compelling the plaintiff to assume full liability would not necessar-
ily reduce the relevant irreparable costs as far as it does not differentiate
between undeserved-wealth-transfer and deadweight-loss. Thus, this aim
cannot justify a remedy that bases the plaintiffs liability on the
defendant's harm.
In sum, remedies for wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions that
are based on partial or full compensation of the defendant's harms are
91. See supra Part I.A.
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not tailored to advancing the aim of minimizing irreparable harm. The
plaintiff should bear only part of the defendant's harms, and the scope of
this liability should be limited to undeserved-wealth-transfers.
2. Restitution of Benefits
According to the rule under consideration, the plaintiffs liability is
limited to the benefit she gained from the preliminary injunction at the
defendant's expense. These benefits include the avoided harms, profits
gained due to the injunction's effect on the plaintiffs market share, and
any other advantage that the plaintiff obtained as a result of the wrong-
fully-issued preliminary injunction. Defining what benefits should be
considered as obtained "at the expense of' the defendant is difficult. In
related contexts, courts usually employ the rather restrictive so-called
"arithmetic subtraction" concept, according to which the plaintiff gained
a benefit at the expense of the defendant if, and only if, the benefit
corresponds to a parallel loss to the defendant. 92 Accordingly, the rem-
edy of restitution will provide the defendant with the lesser of the benefit
gained by the plaintiff and the defendant's loss.
The restitutionary remedy saves the court from the need to evaluate,
when deciding whether to issue the preliminary injunction, the scope of
undeserved-wealth-transfers from the defendant to the plaintiff due to
wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions. Indeed, the purpose of reduc-
ing the amount of information that the court is required to analyze in
deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction justifies precisely the
remedy of disgorgement of benefits. As we explained, only this
component of the social costs can be mitigated by an ex-post remedy.
The provision of a restitutionary remedy enables the court to focus on
evaluating only the expected deadweight-loss (and irreparable-wealth-
transfers) of wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions, and it thus
increases the likelihood that the court will decide correctly.
Moreover, when a wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction is
expected to generate only a wealth transfer, the availability of the remedy
of restitution makes it unnecessary to evaluate the likelihood that the
plaintiff will win the case. Consider, for illustration, an upstream factory
92. See Dobbs, supra note 29, at 1140-42 ("The decisions ... suggest not only that restitution
will be denied unless the plaintiff's gains are traceable to and identifiable with the defendant's
losses, but also that the gains must be directly traceable."). For a discussion of the requirement of
"corresponding loss" in the law of unjust enrichment, see PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 78-86
(2d ed. 2005). Interestingly, Fuller and Perdue employ the same notion in their definition of "restitu-
tion interest" in the contractual context. See Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 53-54 (1936) (arguing that the object of protecting
the "restitution interest" is "the prevention of gain by the defaulting promisor at the expense of the
promisee").
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that uses the same water as the downstream laundry. Assume that the
factory cools the water to a degree that is harmful to the laundry
business, but not to the environment nor to anyone else. The laundry
claims to have a right to water at its natural temperature and thus is suing
the factory to enjoin it from cooling the water temperature.93 Assume
also that the factory can prevent the harm to the laundry during the litiga-
tion and that ex-post monetary relief can eliminate both the harm to the
laundry and the harm to the factory (note that it does not follow from the
last assumption that there is no concern of an irreparable social cost in
this case).94 Under these assumptions, if the laundry is required to
disgorge all of the benefit that it obtained at the expense of the factory
from the wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction, the decision whether
to issue a preliminary injunction should be based only on the decision of
which party is the "cheapest cost avoider." There is no need to evaluate
the relative merits of the parties' cases at the time of issuing the
preliminary injunction.
The aim of an ex-post minimization of the social costs from wrong-
fully-issued preliminary injunctions clearly justifies a restitutionary
remedy, which bases the plaintiffs liability on the benefit that was
unjustifiably taken by the plaintiff from the defendant as a result of the
injunction.95 This remedy applies only to costs that are truly reparable
from the social perspective. Moreover, the aim of minimizing social
costs can support the provision of a restitutionary remedy even when the
benefits were not obtained at the expense of the defendant in the "arith-
metic subtraction" sense. As recently suggested by Doug Lichtman,
errant benefits, even when they are not accompanied by a corresponding
loss, might skew incentives and thus inflict social costs. 96 In such cases,
the remedy of restitution of benefits is the only possible scheme that can
mitigate these social costs.
9 7
93. Even if the parties do not face prohibitively high transaction costs, they might fail to reach
an agreement without a well-defined initial allocation of the entitlement.
94. For example, if the factory does not prevent the harm during the litigation, even though it is
the "cheapest cost avoider," the gap between the harm to the laundry and the factory's cost of
preventing this harm represents an irreparable deadweight-loss.
95. Cf HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 52-63 (2004) (explaining
restitution for mistakes as a mechanism to minimize social costs of mistakes).
96. Lichtman, supra note 67, at 1289-90, 1297 ("If the patentee is mistakenly awarded pre-
liminary relief, the patentee is ... better off. But it would be surprising were society to applaud that
error. Patent law is intended to award this patentee a certain payoff-a payoff designed to create
particular incentives .... Any deviation from that baseline distorts those incentives .... ").
97. However, not all preliminary injunctions that merely confer a benefit on the plaintiff inflict
social harm. In some cases, the restitutionary remedy is only instrumental to making the plaintiff
compensate the defendant. See Ariel Porat, When Do Irreparable Benefits Matter? A Response to
Douglas Lichtman on Irreparable Benefits, 116 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 385 (2007), available at
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Consider in this context cases in which the benefit to the plaintiff is
not accompanied by a corresponding loss to the defendant. Typical
examples concern benefits that are higher than the defendant's corre-
sponding loss and benefits that were derived at the expense of third
parties, such as consumers or employees. The aforementioned case of
Mitchell v. Riegel Textile, Inc.,98 demonstrates the last scenario. The
moving parties in that case, cotton mill owners, clearly benefited from
the injunction by being allowed to pay less than the minimum wage for
the length of the litigation. Yet, their benefits were not accompanied by
a corresponding financial loss for the defendant, the Secretary of Labor.
In fact, it was achieved at the expense of third parties-the moving
parties' employees. One way to justify requiring the plaintiff to disgorge
her benefits in such a case is by showing that the mere errant gain creates
a social loss, because it might skew the plaintiffs incentives,99 and this
harm can be reparable through restitution. If such social harm cannot be
demonstrated, the defendant's claim of restitution can be supported only
if there is a real possibility that he will pass on his reward to the third
parties, i.e., if he is actually suing on their behalf. If such a move is
impractical, the remedy would not help to minimize social loss and,
therefore, would not allow the court to disregard it in its initial decision.
The only consideration that remains in force is that of preventing frivo-
lous suits for preliminary injunction, an issue we explore in Part IV.
If this consideration is important enough, then it might justify a restitu-
tionary remedy. If not, for instance because litigation is costly and the
chances of success in the litigation are high enough, benefits extracted
from third parties should not be subject to restitution in the case of a
wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction.
A difficult question, which we cannot fully address here, is whether
third parties should be entitled to restitutionary claims for wrongfully-
issued preliminary injunctions. As mentioned above, the Supreme Court
recognized such a claim in Arkadelphia Milling, °00 while the English
Court of Appeal rejected it in SmithKline.'0 1 The disparity can be
explained by the fact that Arkadelphia dealt with third parties who
directly transferred money to the losing plaintiff, whereas SmithKline
was concerned with third parties who lost business to the plaintiff, such
that the plaintiffs benefits were only indirectly gained at their expense.
http://yalelawjournal.org/2007/05/06/porat.html. Thus, if the plaintiff gained without imposing an
equivalent harm on the defendant, a restitutionary remedy may not be justified in all cases.
98. 259 F.2d 954 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
99. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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Though we do not find this distinction relevant when the restitution
claim is brought by the defendant, it may serve to limit the number of
potential claimants, thus preventing nuisance claims against the plaintiff.
Arguably, an inherent difficulty with a restitutionary remedy is that
of costs of proof. The basic concern runs as follows. In a harm-based
remedy, the potential plaintiff is the victim (the party who was wrongly
restrained), who possesses more information than the injurer (the moving
party) possesses about his own losses. In contrast, in a restitution-based
remedy, the potential plaintiff possesses less information than the
moving party. As a result, the enforcement of the latter remedy can be
expected to be partial and entail high litigation costs.102 While this
argument may have its merits in some cases, it is not a conclusive one.
The arguably higher administrative costs of applying the restitutionary
remedy do not necessarily surpass the above-mentioned benefits of this
remedy. Moreover, even in terms of administrative costs, one should
take into account additional factors in comparing between the two types
of remedies. First, due to the uncertainty of the scope of the moving par-
ty's liability under the harm-based remedy, capping it at the amount of
the bond is inevitable. 10 3 As a result, the upper limit of the defendant's
compensation is set at an early stage of the litigation on the basis of a
prediction of possible future harms and subject to other constraints in
setting the amount of the bond. 10 4 The restitutionary remedy is free from
these limitations, as it is set at the end of trial after the actual benefit was
obtained. It seems reasonable to assume that this evidentiary advantage
of the remedy of restitution more than offsets its above-mentioned
difficulty. Second, proving the scope of benefits obtained may be easier
than that of harms, as the latter entails a counterfactual analysis, whereas
the former requires an evaluation of the actual benefits obtained by the
moving party.
In sum, the above discussion justifies the provision of a restitution-
ary remedy. Consequently, courts should be encouraged to allow this
remedy in all cases, without subjecting it to further limitations.
102. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: An Exercise in
Private Law Theory, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRES L. 115, 142-44 (2000) (damages for breach is a
superior remedy over disgorgement of benefits since the difficulties involved in proving the scope of
the promisor's profits entail high litigation costs and create uncertainty); Donald Wittman, Liability
for Harm or Restitution for Benefit?, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 57 (1984) (accentuating the role of the
litigation costs entailed by the two different methods).
103. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
104. See supra Part l.A.
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IV. DESIGNING THE LITIGANTS' INCENTIVES IN
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PROCEEDINGS
The remedy for wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions shapes
the plaintiffs incentives to apply for preliminary relief and the defen-
dant's motivation to object to it. Indeed, liability for a wrongfully-issued
preliminary injunction "deter[s] rash applications for interlocutory orders
and thus avoids wasting the court's time with flimsy applications."'
0 5
However, to be valid, this aim must be substantially narrowed. While it
is true that without any remedy for a wrongfully-issued preliminary
injunction the plaintiffs incentives to apply for it would be excessive,
the attempt to use the remedial regime to direct the plaintiff to apply for a
preliminary injunction only when its issuance is socially efficient is
unattainable. It is therefore better to concentrate on the more modest aim
of preventing frivolous motions while not over-deterring legitimate ones.
The following discussion explains and establishes these three proposi-
tions. It shows that the plaintiffs liability for a wrongfully-issued
preliminary injunction should be limited to undeserved-wealth-transfers.
A. Causing the Plaintiff to Internalize Negative Externalities
The aim of preliminary injunctions is to maximize social welfare
such that the defendant will not continue his disputed behavior during the
trial if, and only if, the social cost that the preliminary injunction will
prevent exceeds the social cost that will be inflicted by the preliminary
injunction. 10 6 The likelihood that an efficient outcome will be achieved
is determined not only according to the legal doctrine that the court
applies in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, but also by
the litigants' behavior.
In the absence of remedies for wrongfully-issued preliminary
injunctions, the plaintiffs interest in obtaining a preliminary injunction
may exceed the social interest in issuing it for two main reasons. First,
the plaintiff cannot be expected to internalize the deadweight-loss that
would be inflicted on the defendant and on third parties in the case of a
105. Morton, supra note 82, at 1867. See also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 649 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (The threat of liability insures that a party would apply for a preliminary
injunction only when he is "confiden[t] in his legal position."); Nat'l Kidney Patients Ass'n v. Sulli-
van, 958 F.2d 1127, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding that the threat of liability forces the plaintiff "to
consider the injury to be inflicted on its adversary in deciding whether to press ahead"); Hoxworth v.
Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 211 (3d Cir. 1990); Coyne-Delany Co. v. Capital Dev. Bd.
of Ill., 717 F.2d 385, 392 (7th Cir. 1983); Calderon, supra note 24, at 133 (The purpose of liability
for a wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction is "to deter plaintiffs from filing frivolous claims for
relief."); Dobbs, supra note 29, at 1094, 1119 ("[l1t is desirable to discourage the harassing plaintiff
by insisting that he risk something himself.").
106. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 64, at 595-96.
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wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction. In fact, the plaintiff may ben-
efit from inflicting some deadweight-loss on the defendant, given that it
may substantially strengthen the plaintiffs bargaining position vis-A-vis
the defendant in negotiations for settlements.1 °7 Second, a preliminary
injunction provides the plaintiff with a private profit-the opportunity to
derive a benefit that is taken from the defendant or from third parties.
Evaluating whether the issuance of a preliminary injunction is efficient
requires that such benefits will be taken into account (as far as they are
irreparable if the injunction is not issued) only in a discounted value,
which represents the likelihood that the plaintiff is entitled to derive
them. In contrast, the plaintiff would consider the opportunity to derive
these benefits even if it is not entitled to them, i.e., even in the case of a
wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction. 108 Given the plaintiff's exces-
sive incentives to apply for a preliminary injunction, it is desirable to
apply a remedial regime that would decrease the plaintiffs interest in
using it.
Inasmuch as the remedy aims at directing the parties, one should
consider its effect on not only the plaintiffs incentives but on the defen-
dant's incentives, as well. While the plaintiff should be directed to act
107. See Jean 0. Lanjouw & Josh Lerne, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions,
44 J.L. & ECON. 573 (2001) (arguing that firms tend to request preliminary injunctions to impose
financial stress on their rivals and thus to improve their bargaining position in settlement negotia-
tions). See also Lichtman, supra note 67, at 1295 n.19; Michael Rosenzweig, Target Litigation, 85
MICH. L. REV. 110, 120-21 (1986) (arguing that target firm managers may file lawsuits against
hostile bidders based on the "hope that the lawsuit will be a 'show-stopper'.... Issuance of even a
preliminary injunction often effectively kills a hostile tender offer, for it postpones indefinitely the
bidder's execution of the offer."); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Injunction Negotiations: An Economic,
Moral, and Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1563 (1975).
108. To illustrate, consider a case in which the plaintiff and the defendant compete in the same
market, and the plaintiff claims that he is entitled to exclusivity. Assume that if a preliminary
injunction is not issued, each party will obtain a profit of $50 by the time the case is resolved, and if
the plaintiff wins, he can recover the defendant's profit, $50; while if a preliminary injunction is
issued, the plaintiff's profits will increase to $120, as a result of his monopoly power. Assume that
the likelihood that the plaintiff is entitled to exclusivity is 60% and that no remedies for wrongfully-
issued preliminary injunctions are available. In this case, the irreparable harm if the preliminary
injunction is not issued is the difference between the plaintiff's monopoly profits, $120, and the
parties' joint profits when they compete, $100. Therefore, the expected value of the social benefit of
issuing the preliminary injunction is represented by $20x0.6=$12. If the preliminary injunction is
issued, the irreparable social costs include the defendant's loss of profit, $50. The expected value of
this harm is $50x0.4-$20. Thus, even before adding the harm imposed on the customers in the
relevant market due to the preliminary injunction's adverse effect on competition, it is clear that in
this example it is socially undesirable to issue the preliminary injunction. However, absent remedies
for wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions, the plaintiff has an interest in obtaining the interim
relief. The plaintiff would disregard the social costs and would derive a benefit that exceeds the
social benefit-the opportunity to derive the extra profits of $70 in the case that its claim is
unsubstantiated, i.e., in probability, 40%. It is obvious that under these conditions-not bearing the
costs while receiving private benefits-the plaintiff will apply for a preliminary injunction in spite of
its social undesirability.
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optimally in deciding whether to apply for preliminary injunctions, the
defendant should be induced to oppose a motion for socially inefficient
preliminary injunctions and to consent to efficient ones.10 9 However, it is
notoriously hard to induce both parties to act efficiently due to the
well-known "double responsibility at the margin" problem. 1" 0 Such an
endeavor requires innovative legal mechanisms that are radically at odds
with current law, such as requiring the moving party to pay damages into
the hands of a third party rather than to the defendant.' Investigation of
such theoretical possibilities lies beyond the scope of our inquiry. It
seems plausible to assume that ex-post remedies for wrongfully-issued
preliminary injunctions have a more substantial effect on the plaintiffs
choice to apply for a preliminary injunction than on the defendant's
decision to resist it. This is because the defendant's acquiescence to the
preliminary injunction may be interpreted as a signal that his defense is
weak. The defendant therefore has a strong incentive to oppose the
injunction anyway. We will thus focus on the remedy's effect on the
plaintiff.
Richard Brooks and Warren Schwartz have recently suggested that
the remedy should be set so as to shift the responsibility for the issuance
of the preliminary injunction from the court to the plaintiff." 2 In their
view, once plaintiffs assume liability for the defendants' full cost of
compliance, courts should "freely allow[] preliminary injunctions.
'' 13
Their underlying assumption is that the plaintiff is better informed than
the court, at least at the early stage in which the hearings are made, of the
merits of the case and of the possible irreparable harms.' 14 However,
even if one accepts this assumption, we question the argument that the
remedy should be designed to shift the discretion to issue a preliminary
injunction from the court to the plaintiff."15
109. John Leubsdorf points out in this respect that "while the plaintiff must find a surety and
post a bond in order to obtain relief, the defendant can avoid an injunction without ensuring that
damages can be collected. Courts should ... [require the defendant] to secure a bond.., as a condi-
tion for the denial of an injunction." Leubsdorf, supra note 62, at 559. He adds that "[riestitution
theory might also enable courts to transfer a defendant's windfalls to the plaintiff in cases where the
substantive law does not provide for damages." Id.
110. See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985) (a remedy that induces internalization by one party (e.g., the breaching party)
may cause externalization by the other party (e.g., the injured party)).
111. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Anti-Insurance, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 203 (2002).
An alternative mechanism is to impose liability on the "negligent" party, but it is unlikely that courts
will apply the concept of negligence to the area of applying for or opposing preliminary orders.
112. Brooks & Schwartz, supra note 72.
113. Id. at 409.
114. Id. at 405.
115. For a related argument, see Note, Interlocutory Injunctions and the Injunction Bond, 73
HARV. L. REV. 333, 334 (1959), noting that "the imposition of liability [on the moving party]
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One obvious reason is the prospect of irreparable harms. Brooks
and Schwartz disregard the fact that a wrongfully-issued preliminary
injunction may inflict harms that cannot be cured by a remedy after
trial. 116  As discussed above, the court's decision whether to issue a
preliminary injunction may be based on quantification-possibly, in
monetary terms--of the relevant irreparable harms."' However, this
quantification is distinct from awarding damages. The compensation is
an ex-post means to mitigate the harm, which is subject to limitations
such as verifiability and burden of proof 118 It is fundamentally distinct
from the monetary value that is attached to such a violation in order to
evaluate its justification. 19 One may advocate a policy of protecting all
entitlements through "liability" rules; that is, measuring the (social) value
of entitlements according to the amount of compensation awarded for
their infringement. 120  However, the current prevailing legal policy is
different, as it protects certain interests through "property" rules by
determining that violating these interests inflicts irreparable harm. 121 The
harm is irreparable in the sense that the "social cost" of violating the
protected interest is assumed to be higher than the compensation that can
be awarded in the case of such a violation.
1 22
can[not) be rationalized . . . on the ground that it is the plaintiff alone who is responsible for the
consequences [of a wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction]". See also DOBBS, supra note 14, at
197 ("The bond ... is not a substitute for the high standards imposed to limit the grant of prelimi-
nary injunctions .... ").
116. Brooks & Schwartz, supra note 72, at 393 (focusing exclusively on the social loss when a
preliminary injunction is not issued).
117. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 275
(1979).
119. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 14, at 189, 197 ("By definition, irreparable harm cannot be
measured in damages, but not all irreparable harm is equal. [I]t is useful to represent that harm in
dollar figures, just as it is useful to represent pain and suffering in dollar figures."). For a general
discussion of the nature of compensation, see Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensu-
rability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993), arguing that compensation can be conceived in a noncommodified
way, as a symbolic action that reinforces our commitments about rights and wrongs, rather than
signifying the harms as commodities.
120. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 725
(1996).
121. See generally Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95
YALE L.J. 1335 (1986).
122. See also Leubsdorf, supra note 71, at 36 ("Disregarding the legalities at the interlocutory
stage ... creates a disjunction between the rule applied then and the substantive law applied at the
final stage.... [l]f the lawmaker instituting the rule of law in question meant that people should be
free to behave in a certain way-not just receive compensation when they cannot-that goal may be
compromised."). In response, Brooks and Schwartz suggest that "[s]ince the entitlement does not
clearly belong to either party, the challenge of unjust nonconsensual appropriation through a pre-
liminary injunction liability rule holds less weight than when breach of contract or constitutional
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Consider, for instance, Brooks and Schwartz's argument that if the
plaintiff assumes full liability for the defendant's harms, a contracting
party (the plaintiff) should freely receive a preliminary injunction that
would restrain the other party (the defendant) from acting in a way that,
the plaintiff argues, constitutes a breach of contract. 123 This suggestion
assigns the plaintiff the power to unilaterally compel the defendant to
"sell" his freedom in matters that are not governed by the contract (as
these are the matters in which the plaintiff would be required to assume
liability). Similar concerns are evident in cases when an employer seeks
to enjoin an employee from leaving the job in breach of contract or when
a plaintiff applies for a preliminary injunction against defamation.
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Moreover, even if one endorses Brooks and Schwartz's analytical
framework, their argument fails due to its impracticability. It is rarely
possible to make the plaintiff fully internalize the consequences of a
wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction. Often, a wrongfully-issued
preliminary injunction harms not only those who were wrongfully
enjoined or restrained, but also third parties. While in principle such
third parties can also be compensated (for instance, through class action),
in practice this outcome is difficult to obtain.
125
Finally, full liability may well result in over-deterrence. In the case
of uncertainty about the defendant's harms, compelling the plaintiff to
assume full liability will introduce considerable uncertainty and may
deter the plaintiff from seeking justified preliminary injunctions. This
concern of over-deterrence is augmented by the fact that the plaintiff
does not internalize some of the social benefits of issuing a preliminary
injunction. The social benefits generated by a preliminary injunction
include all of the deadweight-loss it saves. In contrast, the plaintiff's
benefit consists of only the harm she would have suffered absent the
injunction. As a general matter, a party's failure to seek a preliminary
injunction does not preclude her obtaining monetary compensation
when the case is resolved.12 6  Therefore, the plaintiff is expected to
infringement is clear." Brooks & Schwartz, supra note 72, at 406. As argued in the text, this reply
fails to distinguish between (judicial) quantification of each of the possible assignments of entitle-
ments, given the legal uncertainty, and an ex post compensation when an infringement is proven.
123. Brooks & Schwartz, supra note 72, at 410.
124. See Leubsdorf, supra note 71, at 40. For a discussion of the difficulties in granting pre-
liminary injunction in defamation suits, see Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998).
125. For a related argument, see Leubsdorf, supra note 71, at 41-43, pointing out the problems
of imposing liability for harms to third-parties, mainly when the defendant does not wish (or is not
qualified) to litigate what amounts to a class action.
126. For examples found in the closely related context of appeal proceedings, see LiButti v.
United States, 178 F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir. 1999), and Fulton County Silk Mills v. Irving Trust Co. (In
re Lilyknit Silk Underwear Co.), 73 F.2d 52, 53 (2d Cir. 1934).
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ignore the social benefit of preventing deadweight-loss generated by the
defendant's unrestrained activities during the trial so long as the plaintiff
expects to receive compensation for this harm at the end of trial. In addi-
tion, from the social perspective, the relevant irreparable harms include
harms to third parties, while the plaintiff benefits only from preventing
those irreparable harms that she would suffer but for the injunction.
Absent remedies for wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions, this
externalization of some social benefits is immaterial because applying
for a preliminary injunction does not involve significant costs (aside
from litigation costs). Therefore, it is sufficient that the plaintiff expects
to derive some benefit from the preliminary injunction to provide the
plaintiff with an adequate incentive to apply for it. However, once the
plaintiff is required to assume full liability for the defendant's harms in
the case of a wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction, the plaintiff
might be deterred from applying, not only for a socially inefficient form
of relief, but for efficient relief as well. Thus, the mitigation of the
concern of "under-deterrence" might come at the cost of increasing the
likelihood of "over-deterrence."
The main problem is that the latter prospect raises a greater concern
than the former. Socially inefficient preliminary injunctions can be
avoided through the court's discretion over whether to issue the relief. In
contrast, if the plaintiff is deterred from applying for socially efficient
relief, the court does not get the opportunity to examine whether to issue
such relief. In such cases, the defendant may have an interest in volun-
tarily restraining himself to avoid liability in case the plaintiff would win
the case. However, such self-restraint can be expected to be insufficient
because the defendant cannot expect to receive, after winning the case,
compensation for the harms suffered due to his self-restraint. Therefore,
if the parties cannot agree on their activities until the dispute is resolved,
due to reasons such as transaction costs, information asymmetry, or legal
regulations (e.g., antitrust law), the prospect of "over-deterrence" poses a
substantial concern.
Thus, the proposition that imposing full liability justifies assigning
the plaintiff the power to decide whether to issue the pre-trial relief can-
not be sustained. Inevitably, courts should retain the discretion whether
to issue an injunction. Notwithstanding our skepticism regarding Brooks
and Schwartz's proposal, we do agree that the remedy's effect on the
plaintiffs ex-ante incentives is relevant. As argued below, the remedy
can contribute to the removal of improper incentives to apply for a
preliminary injunction while still avoiding over-deterrence.
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B. Removing Improper Incentives
The remedy can serve to eliminate the plaintiffs incentive to apply
for a preliminary injunction strictly for the purpose of extracting a bene-
fit from the issuance of a wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction.
Extracting such a benefit is clearly an illegitimate goal, as it is derived in
violation of the defendant's legal entitlement. Remedies should thus be
designed to remove the incentive to apply for a preliminary injunction
for extracting this illegitimate benefit.
It may seem as if it is socially desirable to enable the plaintiff to
obtain the benefit from wrongly enjoining the defendant, given that this
can offset the concern that the plaintiff does not internalize the full social
benefit of issuing the relief. However, such reasoning is flawed. A
scheme that motivates plaintiffs to apply for a preliminary injunction by
allowing them to retain the benefits derived from a wrongfully-issued
preliminary injunction provides awkward incentives. It provides the
plaintiff an incentive that is negatively correlated with the strength of the
plaintiffs case because the expected value of the ability to retain these
benefits is higher the lower the plaintiffs chances are of winning the
case. It is thus a scheme that encourages plaintiffs to apply for prelimi-
nary injunctions for the wrong reason, and it works precisely in those
cases in which it is against the social interest to issue a preliminary
injunction.
We suggest that, in terms of directing the plaintiff, the remedy
should be designed to deter frivolous applications for preliminary injunc-
tions; that is, applications that are aimed at extracting the benefits
of wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions. At the same time, the
remedy should not deter the plaintiff from applying whenever there are
other, legitimate reasons for issuing a preliminary injunction, i.e., the
prevention of irreparable harms.
The desired range of the remedy according to this approach can be
determined using the following notations:
Dp the plaintiffs harm (or lost benefit) if a preliminary
injunction is not issued;
a the portion of the plaintiffs harm (or lost benefit) that is,
from the plaintiffs perspective, irreparable;
127
p the probability that the plaintiff will win the case on its
merits; and
127. As explained above, the court's decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction should
be based on an assessment of the "socially" irreparable harms. However, the plaintiff's decision is
based on an assessment of the harms that are "privately" irreparable, i.e., harms for which the
plaintiff cannot expect to receive sufficient ex-post compensation.
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R the remedy for a wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction.
To remove the illegitimate incentive, the remedy should not be
lower than the plaintiffs benefit from a wrongfully-issued preliminary
injunction. This benefit equals the plaintiffs harm (or lost benefit) if a
preliminary injunction was not issued, Dp. Therefore, the first condition
that the remedy, R, should fulfill is the following:
(1 - p)R >! (I - p) Dp => R > Dp
At the same time, the remedy should be capped to ensure that it
does not deter the plaintiff from applying for a preliminary injunction
when the provisional relief may serve legitimate interests, namely avoid-
ing irreparable harms. The expected value of the plaintiffs benefit from
the preliminary injunction consists of two elements: (1) if the plaintiff
wins the case, the plaintiffs benefit from the preliminary injunction is
the irreparable part of its harm, aDp; and (2) if the plaintiff loses the case,
the benefit equals the plaintiffs entire harm if the preliminary injunction
was not issued, Dp. Therefore, the second condition that the remedy
should fulfill, which ensures that it does not deter the plaintiff from
applying for a preliminary injunction when it may serve legitimate
interests, is the following:
(I - p)R <_ pa Dp + (I - p) Dp =: R <_ Dp [a(p /(I - p)) + 1
In sum, to achieve the aim of removing the illegitimate incentive
without over-deterring the plaintiff from applying for a preliminary
injunction to avoid irreparable harm, the remedy should be set in the
following range:
Dp <_ R < Dp[a(p /(I - p)) + 1
For instance, if a=O, such that all the plaintiffs harms are reparable
(pointless application), a remedy that is equal to the plaintiffs harm (or
lost benefit) if the preliminary injunction was not issued, Dp, is sufficient
to remove the plaintiffs interest in applying for a preliminary injunction.
Similarly, if p=O, such that the plaintiff has no chance of winning the
case (frivolous applications), the above remedy again deters the plaintiff
from applying for a preliminary injunction. Such a remedy does not
deter the plaintiff if at least some of her harms are irreparable (a>O) and
the plaintiff has some chance of winning the case (p>O). This set of
conditions will serve us in evaluating different types of remedies.
936 [Vol. 32:903
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C. An Evaluation of the Possible Remedies
1. Compensation for Harms
Requiring the plaintiff to bear only part of the actual costs may
induce her to apply for inefficient preliminary injunctions. Whenever the
plaintiffs actual liability is lower than her expected benefit, the plaintiff
is not deterred from pursuing even frivolous claims. As discussed above,
it is similarly undesirable to impose full liability on the plaintiff. In
general, optimal deterrence cannot be obtained given the prospects of
irreparable harms to the defendant and harms to third parties resulting
from a wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction. 128  Sometimes, for
instance in patent cases, even full liability would not deter frivolous
suits, for the benefit to the plaintiff from a wrongfully-issued preliminary
injunction is higher than the full cost to the defendant. 129 More impor-
tantly, in other cases, full liability might deter the plaintiff from applying
for socially efficient preliminary injunctions. Over-deterrence may occur
because a rule of full compensation causes the plaintiff to internalize the
entire harm generated by the wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction,
while the plaintiff does not internalize the full social benefit of issuing
the preliminary injunction.
Over-deterrence may be avoided if the externalized social benefit
does not exceed the private benefit that the plaintiff expects to derive
from a wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction. Thus, the concern of
over-deterrence is acute in cases in which the preliminary injunction
aims to protect mainly third parties. 130 This reasoning justifies a rule that
requires public interest plaintiffs to post only a nominal bond, which caps
their liability for wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions.
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128. See supra Part [V.A.
129. For accentuating the importance of taking into account the concern of "errant gains," see
Lichtman, supra note 67.
130. To illustrate, assume that the defendant's behavior causes damage to each of two plain-
tiffs. The irreparable damage during the litigation is $200, equally divided between the plaintiffs.
The defendant can take precautionary measures that would prevent the damage to both plaintiffs, but
not damage to only one of them. The socially irreparable cost of taking these precautions during the
litigation is $150. Assume that the likelihood that the plaintiffs are legally entitled to stop the defen-
dant's activity is 50%. A preliminary injunction is socially desirable, as its expected social benefit
($ 100) exceeds its expected cost ($50). However, if the plaintiffs do not collaborate, they will not
apply for a preliminary injunction, given that it is the party who applies for it who would be exclu-
sively liable to compensate the defendant for a wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction.
131. See Calderon, supra note 24, at 136 ("Frivolous claims are adequately screened out by the
preliminary injunction test ... and by the nearly insurmountable financial obstacles to public interest
litigation."); Morton, supra note 82, at 1869-70 (finding that in environmental cases "courts are less
worried about frivolous suits and more concerned with providing the judicial review Congress
intended under the statute"); id. at 1905 ("[I]n noncommercial cases, the courts should ... consider
the effect of the bond requirement on the enforcement of the important federal right the plaintiff
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According to the more modest aim defined above, the plaintiffs
liability should be designed to deter frivolous applications for a prelimi-
nary injunction by denying the plaintiff the right to retain the benefit
derived from a wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction while avoiding
over-deterrence. Specifically, as shown above, the scope of the
plaintiffs liability for a wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction should
be limited to the following range:
Dp :!_ R <_ Dp[a(p /(I - p)) + 1
Recall that Dp denotes the plaintiffs benefit from the issuance of
the preliminary injunction. Thus, it is difficult, and maybe even imprac-
tical, to ensure that this pair of conditions is met when the plaintiffs
liability is set according to the defendant's harm rather than the
plaintiffs benefit. Nevertheless, one can outline the relevant parameters
that should be considered in setting the scope of the plaintiffs liability
given the aim of directing the plaintiff.
The lower limit of the plaintiff s liability should be her benefit from
the issuance of the preliminary injunction, i.e., the plaintiffs harms if
the preliminary injunction had not been issued, Dp. This limit aims to
mitigate the concern of under-deterrence. Thus, when the defendant's
harms are below the plaintiffs benefits, it is justifiable to require the
plaintiff to assume full liability for a wrongfully-issued preliminary
injunction.
The upper limit of the plaintiffs liability should be set as an
increasing function of both a, the portion of the plaintiffs harm (or lost
benefit) that is, from the plaintiffs perspective, irreparable, and p, the
probability that the plaintiff will win the case on the merits. The higher
the values of these parameters, the lower the concern that imposing full
liability would result in over-deterrence. Therefore, when the defen-
dant's harm exceeds the plaintiffs benefit, the plaintiff should bear only
part of the defendant's costs. All else being equal, this portion should be
smaller the lower the irreparable part of the plaintiffs harm is (in the
absence of the preliminary injunction), and the lower the probability that
the plaintiff will win the case (as estimated at the preliminary stage).
This result may seem counter-intuitive, since the lower a and p, the more
seeks to enforce."). See also Kansas ex rel. Stephan v. Adams, 705 F.2d 1267, 1270 (10th Cir.
1983); Crowley v. Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving, 679 F.2d 978, 1000 (lst Cir. 1982),
rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 526 (1984) ("In order not to restrict a federal right unduly, the
impact that a bond requirement would have on enforcement of the right should also be considered.");
H & R Block, Inc. v. McCaslin, 541 F.2d 1098, 1099 (5th Cir. 1976); Page Commc'ns Eng'rs, Inc.
v. Froehlke, 475 F.2d 994, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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probable it is that issuing the preliminary injunction is socially
inefficient. Thus, in such cases, the plaintiffs liability should be more
expansive to deter plaintiffs from applying for socially inefficient
preliminary injunctions. However, as indicated above, the assumption
that the plaintiffs liability should be designed to deter her from applying
for socially inefficient preliminary injunctions is wrong.
The above result is based on the incorporation of the concern of
over-deterrence. The lower the irreparable part of the plaintiffs harm if
the preliminary injunction is not issued and the lower the probability
that the plaintiff will win the case, the lesser the plaintiffs incentives to
apply for a preliminary injunction. These are precisely the cases in
which the plaintiffs liability should be limited to avoid over-deterrence.
Thus, if we set the remedy as a function of the harm, there is an inherent
contradiction between the conditions for limiting the remedy against the
plaintiff (low irreparable damage and low probability for success) and
the circumstances in which courts are likely to be sympathetic to the
plaintiffs cause (high irreparable damage and high probability for
success). This contradiction makes it very unlikely that courts would
apply the remedy of damages in a way that would not cause
over-deterrence.
2. Restitution of Benefits
Recall that according to the rule under consideration, the plaintiffs
liability would be limited to the benefit she gained from the preliminary
injunction at the defendant's expense. The restitutionary remedy does
not deter plaintiffs from applying for socially efficient preliminary
injunctions. This remedy does not impose on the plaintiff a cost for
applying for a preliminary injunction, and thus the concern of over-
deterrence does not materialize. This result can be demonstrated through
the pair of conditions defined below:
Op <! R: < Op[a(p /(I - p)) + 1]
As indicated, the amount of restitution, R, is set as the minimum
between the plaintiffs benefit, Dp, and the defendant's harm. Thus, the
condition on the right-hand side is always fulfilled since the remedy can-
not exceed Dp. The left-hand side condition is met only if the plaintiffs
benefit is less than the defendant's harm. Therefore, such a restitutionary
remedy will not over-deter legitimate claims, but it might under-deter
frivolous suits. Notice, however, that under-deterrence will occur only in
those cases where a harm-based remedy of compensation is also
insufficient to prevent frivolous claims.
Seattle University Law Review
CONCLUSION
When a judicial decision is reversed or set aside, the court is faced
with the dilemma of whether it should reassign harms inflicted and bene-
fits gained as a result of the reversed decision. Courts traditionally prefer
harm-based liability to a benefit-based remedy.1 32  This inclination is
followed in cases of wrongfully-issued preliminary injunctions, as courts
prefer (partial) liability for harms over disgorgement of the benefits
obtained due to the wrong injunction. We suggest that the approach
should be precisely the opposite. Courts should manifest a greater
willingness to require the losing plaintiff to give up her benefits derived
from a wrongfully-issued preliminary injunction rather than require
her to compensate the defendant for his losses. Restitution of benefits
extracted without a true cause, rather than compensation for harm
inflicted by the court's order, better advances the aim of minimizing
social harm.
For instance, the benefit extracted by a patent holder from obtaining
a preliminary injunction is often greater than the loss suffered by the
defendant, since the plaintiff is able to charge monopoly prices while the
preliminary injunction is in force. In other words, the injunction causes
wealth transfers from the defendant to the patentee. The main
deadweight-loss that results from such an injunction is suffered by third
parties, such as consumers. Allowing a restitutionary remedy in this
scenario, then, is desirable. It allows the court to focus on the irreparable
losses suffered by the plaintiff and third parties. In addition, the restitu-
tionary remedy helps minimize the social harm of the wrong decision,
turning part of the defendant's loss into a reparable wealth transfer, and it
has no deterrent effect on the plaintiff (except perhaps under-deterrence
in certain situations). In fact, this view can be supported from a doctrinal
perspective as well, assuming that the definition of property is extended
to include the "right to conduct business," a freedom of the defendant
that was usurped by the plaintiff. 1
33
132. See Grosskopf, supra note 11, at 1994-95 (finding that one of the prominent products of
the Anglo-American legal tradition is "the preference for harm-based remedies over benefit-based
remedies, as far as protecting entitlement is concerned," and arguing that this tendency need not be
transferred to the case of protection competition rules); Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71
VA. L. REv. 65, 67 (1985) (noting and explaining the "asymmetry between the law's treatment of
harms and its treatment of benefits"); Porat, supra note 10 (arguing that Anglo-American law is
much more willing to deal with negative externalities (harms) than with positive externalities
(benefits)); Wittman, supra note 102 (arguing that there is asymmetry in the administrative costs of
managing harms and benefits, which makes state agents prefer a baseline that defines those external-
ities they wish to address as harms).
133. Friedmann, supra note 11, at 538 ("The [defendant's] interest in doing business with his
clients, though not a traditional property right, can be regarded as quasi-property .... [W]hen the
other party appropriated this interest by a court decision that was later reversed, his enrichment was
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The analysis enriches our understanding of the variety of aims of
restitutionary remedies. Two familiar aims are internalizing positive
benefits3 4 and deterring wrong behavior. 135 The case of a wrongfully-
issued preliminary injunction demonstrates a third possible aim of
disgorgement of profits-the removal of improper motives to engage in
an overall socially desirable behavior.
unjust even his suit was not tortuous"). Cf SmithKline Beecham PLC v. Apotex Europe Ltd.,
[2007] Ch. 71, 96-97 (rejecting the argument that "a mere freedom to trade" should be classified as
property).
134. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 10 (explaining the effect of restitutionary remedies
on incentives to take part in rescue activity); Ariel Porat, supra note 10.
135. Supra note 11 and accompanying text.
